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Abstract

The analysis of price inflation in the People's Republic of China should be
based on an understanding that in LDCs (less developed countries) which are
typically attentive to the issue of "growth promotion by political force" price
inflation can occur for reasons quite different from those which dominate in
DCs (developed countries) which are more sensitive to employment and output
stability.

Inflation in the PRC is of the LDC-type and has become a prominent

subject of analysis and concern as the system has become involved in a process
of market oriented price reforms since 1978.

With the remonetization of the

economy, the stage was set for the use of the sovereign political power of
money printing to solve growth related issues.

The paper argues that the

main-line (Keynesian) framework of monetary analysis must be rejected for the
study of inflation in the PRC.

Instead, it develops a "loanable funds theory"

based on a monetary approach which stresses (i) the role of money as a medium
of exchange rather than a liquid asset; (ii) monetary expansion as an
artificial creation of purchasing power that meets the demand for "finance" and
competes with "earned" purchasing power for the command of goods and services
in the market; (iii) inflation as a phenomenon which occurs when the money
using public exercises its "monetary sovereignty" to attempt to frustrate the
attempt by political forces to "force saving" in its direction.

A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Inflation in the PRC

After the founding of the socialist People's Republic of China (PRC) in
1949, the price level remained fairly stable for thirty years (1949-78) in an
economy with an organization characterized by central command.

However, since

the launching of the total economic reform in 1978, price inflation has plagued
the economy and obstructed
reform.

present efforts to deepen the market-oriented price

Price inflation is an extremely complex social phenomenon, and hence a

distinction should be made between the causes of price inflation for DCs
(industrially advanced developed countries) and LDCs (contemporary less
developed countries) that have been in the transition process of economic
modernization since the Second World War (1950-90).

From a typological and

historical perspective, price inflation in the PRC has certain features unique
to a socialist LDC during a transitional period of both modernization and
reorganization (i.e., an unprecedented liberalization of the socialist command
system).

It is the purpose of this paper to outline a theoretical framework

for the analysis of price inflation in this particular context.
Many factors, such as wage-cost pushes, oil crises, and agricultural
shortfalls, could be identified as the primary causes of increases in price
levels.

However, there is a consensus that sustaining a growth rate of money

(~M) in excess of the GNP growth rate C~y) is both necessary and sufficient for
price inflation that is sustained over time.

(In this paper the notation~

(dx/dt)/x will be used to denote the growth rate of the time series (x)).

X

=

The

inflation experience of the PRC in recent years seems to have taken on this
sustained characteristic.

Thus we are primarily interested in

an appropriate monetary theory of price inflation.
assume that the PRC is a closed economy.)

searching for

(For simplicity, we shall
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Our paper will begin with an inquiry into the pressures leading to
monetary expansion (~M) that may originate in the country's economic and
political culture.

During the postwar years the average price inflation rate

(~p) in the LDCs as a group has been much higher than that of the DCs. The
higher average inflation rate in LDCs is due, at least partly, to the absence
of the

political culture of central bank autonomy.

Consequently, monetary

expansion is used persistently as a policy instrument to promote growth via the
manufacture of profit for industries patronized by the political forces.

This

emphasis on &rowth promotion in LDCs is an entirely different policy objective
from the

promotion of full-employment stability in the DCs.

We shall argue

that the truly epoch-making aspect of the market-oriented reform in the PRC
after 1978 is the monetization of the economic system that paved the road
toward price inflation of the LDC-type (Section I).
In the DCs, price-inflation theory was a part of macroeconomics that has
been dominated in the postwar years by the mainline thinking of Keynesianism.
In section II, we shall give a succinct summary of the Keynesian model to
highlight certain doctrinaire positions in the Keynesian tradition.

We shall

argue that, since these doctrinaire positions are so incompatible with the
empirical reality of the LDCs, the Keyensian approach is unlikely to be helpful
for the analysis of price inflation in LDCs in general and in the PRC in
particular (section II.)
Many economists would regard the savings function concept as the most
important contribution that has brought about the Keynesian revolution in
macroeconomics. (See [Samuelson 1947] page 5 and [Hansen 1947] page 35.)

The

Keynesian tradition carried an underlying tone that the difficulty of making
full use of the virtually unlimited full-employment capacity to save is the
root cause of unemployment in an affluent DC.

A national austerity effort

L
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proxied by an increase of the average propensity to save(S) serves no
constructive purpose because it will only lower the equilibrium level of real
income (Y) via the multiplier process.

It is intuitively obvious that a

revolution resting on a conviction that a national austerity effort is a curse
cannot be helpful for inflation fighting in the poor LDCs that require just
such an effort.
The point of departure for a correct monetary theory of price inflation is
an appropriate monetary philosophy that may stress Mas a medium of exchange
(i.e.,

purchasing power) to command goods and services in the product market,

or as a store of value (i.e., an asset to be held for psychological
satisfaction by the money-loving public).

The doctrinaire position of

Keynesianism is that Mis an asset an increase in the quantity of which will
lower the interest rate [Tobin 1969].

A larger money stock M may lead to price

inflation only by working through the interest avenue (e.g., when investment
and aggregate demand are raised by a lowered r).

However, in the PRC price

inflation has already occurred in recent years, in spite of the fact that an
interest culture has not yet been fully restored at the present time after
being suppressed for the 30 years before 1978.
philosophy is that M should be regarded as

The appropriate monetary

purchasing power.

An increase in

the quantity of M can lead to price inflation with or without variations in the
interest rate.
The growth-sensitive contemporary LDCs (including the PRC) are
characterized by a shortage of output and savings capacity.

For this type of

economy the flow of money printing (dM/dt), as well as the stock of the total
quantity of money (M), play indispensible but different roles in price
inflation theory.

The flow of the increment of money (dM/dt) corresponds to

the artificial printing of unearned purchasing power by the political authority
to

4

meet the demand for investment finance.

The actual spending of the new money

to command goods and services in the product market will run into
resistance and protests from the money-using public.

stiff

The latter can make their

protests effective by spending the stock of monetary purchasing power (M) at
their disposal at a faster pace (proxied by a higher velocity of circulation).
These ideas, traced to the forced-saving notion of the pre-war Loanable Funds
Theory, should be the core of an inflation theory for growth-conscious LDCs, as
will be shown in Section III.
The postwar reign of the Keynesian system over competing economic theories
is credited to its formal, systematic treatment of macroeconomics, covering
both monetary and fiscal policies.

In contrast, the Loanable Funds Theory,

which existed before the War as a money and interest theory, was never fully
integrated with the fiscal system.
LDCs,

It is quite obvious that, for contemporary

price inflation is a result of money creation, not only to help the

private entrepreneur to make money in a politicized growth-promoting effort
but, more importantly, to allow the government to confiscate goods and services
in the market without the consent of the taxpayers.

Thus, when monetary and

fiscal policies are considered in an integrated fashion, inflation occurred in
the LDCs because money was being printed to meet investment finance and deficit
finance (section IV).
While this is true for LDCs in general, two remarks should be added to
clarify the inflation problem in the PRC at the present.

First, in the PRC

investment finance is formally a bureaucratic decision because of the heavy
weight of the state enterprises.

This is because, unlike in capitalistic LDCs

where public enterprises are a minor sector of the economy, in the PRC they are
still the overwhelmingly dominant sector.

Second, the budget deficit is

traceable to the huge government expenditures that must be made to ensure

5

political stability.

When a socialistic state like the PRC is being pushed in

a market- oriented direction, price inflation is a much more highly political
phenomenon than it would be in a capitalist country.
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Section 1:

Overview: Pressure for Monetary Expansion

In a monetized economy, the root causes of price inflation are the social,
political, and economic pressures for monetary expansion.

The People's

Republic of China (PRC) became vulnerable to such pressures when the economy
became monetized after the

economic reform of 1978, (section 1.1).

The LDCs

in the capitalistic camp came under heavy pressure to print money when their
societies were more sensitive to the need for growth promotion than to the need
to maintain full-employment

stability.

Governments operating without a

political culture of central bank autonomy were particularly susceptible to the
temptation to print money in order to stimulate growth. (section 1.2).

For

these nations the inflationary impact of money printing was severe because of
its persistency and directional non-neutrality, thus begging the issue of
income distributional justice, (section 1.3).

As a result, monetary expansion

and price inflation were the result of an income transfer strategy carried out
expeditiously by political forces (section 1.4).
1.1 Disappearance (in 1949) and Revival (in 1978) of Money as an Economic
Institution in the PRC
From an historical perspective, a major evolutionary event in the PRC has
been the disappearance (in 1949), and revival (in 1978), of the monetary system
as an essential economic institution.

The monetization of the Chinese economy

after 1978 provides the background for the occurrence of price inflation.
a) Disappearance of the Monetary Institution (1949-78)
From the founding of the PRC in 1949 until 1978, the mode of economic
organization was characterized by the centralized formation of an

economic

development plan and the reliance on collectivism and political command for its
execution.

(See diagram la.)

Locally, the microscopic economic units (the

family, firms, and farms) were grouped into collectives (rural communes, urban
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collectives, and compartmentalized state enterprises) that were controlled by
two vertical chains of command:

the bureaucracies headed by the State Council

and the party functionaries headed by the Party Secretariat.

The role of the

bureaucracy was to coordinate the production of output by the microscopic
units, and the function of the party was to motivate the economic agents
through the indoctrination of socialist ideologies.
Although the PRC had a nominal monetary system, the RMB (the People's
currency) did not play the organizational roles of unit of account, medium of
exchange, or standard of value familiar to capitalist systems.

The RMB did not

function as a unit of account, because, after all, accounting is only required
of strangers and not of comrades!

When the masses were

supposedly linked by

a revolutionary fraternity of comradeship, the meticulous accounting for
individual rights and obligations was ideologically abhorred.
The RMB did not function as a medium of exchange, since voluntary exchange
of goods between buyers and sellers in the marketplace was replaced by the
mandatory production and delivery of orders set by central planning.

The RMB

was not a standard of value, since the concept of pecuniary value, essential
for material incentives and calculations based on self-interest, was considered
anti-social.

The RMB was not used as an organizational instrument in the

capitalistic sense because the PRC did not have a capitalistic culture!
Under the central command system, the individuals in the microscopic units
that lie at the lowest echelon of a hierarchy of political power may be zealous
as revolutionaries, but are rather lifeless as economic agents.
special role in the Chinese socialist society.

Money played a

As an instrument of

organization the RMB was employed only as a monitoring device for the
microscopic units to fulfill their social and economic obligations as centrally
determined at the top.

The RMB played a role decidedly subordinate to
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political command and central planning.

The apathetic economic agents below

did not need to interact or communicate with each other directly, nor did the
behavioral norms governing the acquisition of monetary purchasing power (so
vital under capitalism) need to be prescribed.
b) Rehabilitation of a Monetized Economy after 1978
The market-oriented reforms after 1978 proceeded at the local as well as
global levels.

Locally, the collectivist group orientation was abandoned as

the microscopic units took on a livelier existence, making independent
decisions, interacting, and assuming individual responsibility for their own
choices. Globally, the vertical systems of political command were partially
dismantled and replaced by direct horizontal interactions guided by market
information. (See Diagram lb.)

The liberalization process that started with

the rural sector when the family farming system was restored is now slowly
spreading into the urban sector.
The remonetization of the Chinese economy after 1978 was the logical
consequence as well as a vital step for the success of the market- oriented
reforms.

For with a diminished sense of comradeship (traced to the separation

of party from economics) and with the stress on responsibility, the activation
of money as a unit of account is a logical necessity.

Economic or financial

responsibility for the microscopic units is meaningless without a strong
dedication to accounting integrity of the individual budgets linked by money.
Since the voluntary selection of trading partners is a basic market choice, a
competitive economy cannot avoid the use of money as a medium of exchange.
Finally, money surfaced as a standard of value with the rehabilitation of the
material incentive.

In the PRC after 1978, chasing after monetary purchasing

power at least partially replaced the desire to use favoritism and security in
the political hierarchy as the primary incentive system.
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The pervasive pecuniary incentive was conducive to meritorious economic
performance (hard work, frugality, innovation, risk-bearing) based on the
principle of equal opportunity.

A monetized society is totally symptomatic of

the capitalistic one defended by Keynes:
For my part, I believe that there is social and psychological justification
for significant inequalities of income and wealth but not for such large
disparities as exist today. There are valuable human activities which
require the motive of money making and the environment of private
wealth-ownership for their full fruition. Moreover, dangerous human
proclivities can be canalized into comparatively harmless channels by the
existence of opportunities for money-making and private wealth, which, if
they cannot be satisfied in this way, may find their outlet in cruelty, the
reckless pursuit of personal power and authority and other forms of
self-aggrandizement. It is better that a man should tyrannize over his
bank balance than over his fellow citizens and whilst the former is
sometimes denounced as being but a mean to the latter, sometimes at least
it is an alternative .... It may still be a wise and prudent statesman to
allow the game to be played as long as the average man is in fact strongly
addicted to the money-making passion. (General Theory of Employment
Interest and Money, page 374).
The tyranny of the money-making passion that has brought about the current
price inflation in the PRC is certainly not as destructive as the cruelty of
the tumultuous Cultural Revolution!
Our conjecture is that, even after the PRC has made considerable progress
in the separation of politics from economics, her economic system will still be
far more politicized than the highly politicized systems of the capitalist
LDCs.

However, the rehabilitation of a monetary institution has permanently

changed the relationship between government and society in the PRC in at least
one major respect:

political influence in economic affairs will be switched

gradually from direct command to the indirect control of macroeconomic
"levers."

These levers are, in fact, monetized policy instruments, utilized by

the government to influence the monetary profitability of the microscopic
units.

(See below.)
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1.2)

The Determination of the Rapidity of the Growth Rate of Money (~M)
In a monetized society, sustained price inflation (~p > 0) is unavoidable

if the money growth rate (~M) is sustained at an excessively high level.
introduction.)

(See

There are two types of causal factors that determine the

rapidity of the money growth rate:

first, the extent to which monetary

expansion is politicized and second, the problem-sensitivity of a country.

The

first factor is related to the political culture of central bank autonomy.

The

second factor, which dividesthe world into DCs and LDCs, has an historical
origin.
a) The Political Culture of Central Bank Autonomy
There is a long Anglo-Saxon tradition of relying on constitutional
democracy to curb the arbitrary powers of government.

In the economic arena,

taxation with consent and Central Bank autonomy are important manifestations of
this distrust of government.
When a metallic monetary standard gives way to a fiat standard, monetary
expansion becomes costless and convenient since it takes only a printing press
to expand its quantity; without a political culture of central bank autonomy,
which unfortunately has been lacking in

most contemporary LDCs, few ambitious

sovereign governments can resist the temptation to monopolize and abuse the
power to print money.

That the government of the PRC party-state has been

ambitious is evident from its desire to achieve the impossible -manufacture instant ethics via class struggle, before 1978.

i.e. to

In comparison, the

manufacture of purchasing power after 1978 seems like a rather mild abuse of
government power!
China, whether the ROG or the PRC, does not have a long cultural tradition
of central bank autonomy.

In the ROG, the central bank is directly responsible

to the Executive Yuan; in the PRC, the People's Bank is an arm of the State
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Council.

While their weak monetary authorities may conscientiously suggest a

money-growth target, it is doubtful that they have the status and stature to
defy the government when ordered to print extra money for a higher rate of
growth.

However, among the LDCs, the Chinese governments (both the ROC and the

PRC), belong to a minority that is quite wary of the distributional injustices
resulting from the printing of money.

The rate of price inflation in China can

be high (between 10 and 20 percent) by the standard of the DCs, but it is never
allowed to rage out of control because of the bitter memories of ruinous war
time inflation (1940-45).
b) Difference in Problem-Sensitivity in DCs and LDCs
During the postwar years (1950-80), the sensitivity of the affluent DCs to
economic instability due to periodic unemployment is traceable directly to the
Great Depression of the thirties.

The Full-Employment Act of 1946 in the U.S.,

and similar legislation elsewhere, were political declarations of war against
instability.

In contrast, the poverty and backwardness resulting from prewar

colonialism made the LDCs conscious not only of the economic necessity of
growth but also of the necessity for promoting political stability and
solidarity.
The stability of a government depends crucially on its establishment of a
national identity and its assumption of a prominent role in state affairs.
the newly independent LDCs the visibility of the political power in the
economic arena is essential, a national steel mill having the same symbolic
significance as a national flag.

A planning commission or an active central

bank overtly dedicated to growth promotion as in socialistic India or the
free-planned economy of Taiwan (whose development has been governed by Sun
Yat-Sen's ideology), indicates a willingness to adopt a mixed economy that
tolerates pervasive government interference in the market.

After 1978, the

In
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avowed goal of the PRC became an ambitious quadrupling of the national income
and resulted in the slogans of the "four modernizations."

At this point the

PRC formally joined the camp of growth-sensitive LDCs and the issue of
socialist ideological purity became irrelevant.
Section 1.3:

Societal Pressure for Monetary Expansion

The pressure for monetary expansion is much higher in a poverty-stricken
LDC preoccupied with growth promotion than in an affluent DC attentive to
economic instability.

This can be examined in terms of the contrast of

persistency versus intermittency, and directional neutrality versus directional
specificity of monetary expansion.
a) Persistency versus Intermittency of Monetary Expansion
When social concern is directed at economic instability, the very notion of
a compensatory monetary and fiscal policy suggests that as a cardinal principle
of aggregate demand management (as in the Keynesian tradition), expansionary
(~M > 0) and contractionary (~M < 0) monetary policies should be used
alternately and intermittently to offset the excess and/or deficiency of
market-determined total expenditures.

One can categorically say that a

stabilization policy in a DC is on the wrong track when deficit finance and/or
monetary expansion occurs persistently and cumulatively through time. This is
what seems to have brought about the

unprecedented double-digit peacetime

price inflation in the DCs in the 1970s.
When monetary expansion is used as a policy instrument to promote growth
rather than to stabilize the economy, the opposite cardinal principle implies
persistency rather than intermittency.

Money printing can promote growth in

LDCs primarily because it is a creation of purchasing power by the government
(i.e. a party that monopolizes money printing) which allows the public and/or
the private entrepreneur to acquire real resources inexpensively for investment
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that augments productive capacity.

This mechanism is indeed the heart of the

thesis of forced savings, under which the money-using public is coerced into
yielding its right to command the use of resources to the investor.
Section III.)

(See

The logic of forced savings suggests its earnest and persistent

application through time.

The government certainly should not oscillate

intermittently in its growth-promotion efforts.
b) Directional Neutrality or Specificity in Monet~ry Expansion
In its efforts to stabilize the economy, a central bank in a DC that is
preoccupied with managing the growth rate of the total quantity of money (~M)
is not really concerned with the allocational direction of the investment
funds.

In the DCs, with aggregate demand management carried through open

market operations, commercial banks and other financial institutions are
responsible for the allocation of loanable funds in financial markets.

This

directional neutrality of monetary expansion in DCs contrasts sharply with the
directional specificity of monetary expansion in the LDCs.

For growth

promotion, the LDC government must be concerned with the priority of the
allocation of investment funds to achieve a balanced sectoral expansion through
the adoption of some version of so-called industrial policy.
In DCs, with a sophisticated financial sector to screen applications for
bank loans, industrial policy is a dirty word.

No DC government would pretend

that it can replace the market with a list ranking the potential profitability
of all future investment projects.

Yet, a planning commission or a ministry of

economic affairs in an LDC would not hesitate to prepare just such a ranking
(covering all industries) as a basis for all discriminatory industrial
policies: tariffs, the prohibition of foreign investment, multiple exchange
rates,

tax-exemption statutes that encourage investment, and the allocation of

bank loans at differential terms and interest rates.

The directional

15
specificity of monetary expansion is but a typical example of a whole set of
such growth promotion policies in the mixed economies of LDCs.

In this regard,

we may add that the rationality of ranking by industrial policy leaves much to
be desired, because the underlying criteria of ranking are usually undisguised
slogans with a nationalistic, emotional appeal: rising sun, locomotives,
up-stream, or, simply "strategic" industries.
As a direct result of market-oriented reforms in 1978, the government of
the PRC has looked earnestly for economic levers to control the monetized
economy indirectly.

(See section 1.lb.)

In the capitalist's lingo, these

"levers" are nothing more or less than a package of growth-promotional policies
that share two properties in common.
the economy is monetized.

First, all of them take for granted that

Second, the cardinal principle underlying all the

levers (e.g. tariff protection and controlled interest rates) is to require and
to help entrepreneurs make a monetary profit on a discriminatory and selective
basis.
which

Thus, with monetization, the PRC moves unwittingly in a direction in
political force is now invoked to help socialist entrepreneurs make

monetary profits, or to avoid the bankruptcy of a whole set of state
enterprises because of monetary loss.
Section 1.4:

The Political Expedience of Covert Income-Transfer Strategies

The implementation of direction-specific growth-promotion policies amounts
to an income transfer from a victimized social class to a politically favored
beneficiary class.

In the case of monetary expansion the transfer is

because the unjust income transfer need not be accounted for openly.

covert,
The

theory of economic instability in DCs sheds no light on the true cause of
inflation in LDCs unless it addresses this issue of social conflict that occurs
in a society dedicated to growth promotion.
a) Income Transfer Strategies
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The direction-specific growth-promotion policies are income-transfer
strategies, since the profit of the beneficiaries (the public and/or private
entrepreneurs) is augmented only at the expense of a victim class.

In this

regard it should be emphasized that, while the transfer strategy is common to
all growth-promotion policies, the mechanisms are characterized by different
degrees of complexity.

It is relatively easy to detect the transfer mechanisms

at work in the case of protective tariffs on passenger cars, for which the
domestic beneficiaries and victims are readily identified as the car
manufacturers and buyers, respectively.

The transfer mechanisms involving the

use of monetary policies and foreign exchange rates are far more difficult to
detect.

The mushroom exporters of Taiwan may not even be aware of the fact

that they are victimized by an overvaluation of exchange rates that augments
the profit of the importers.
b)

Covert Income Transfer Via Money Printin&

When the U.S. government bailed out the troubled Chrysler Corporation with
a loan guarantee, it took a special act of Congress to effect the income
transfer from the taxpayers to Chrysler.

The granting of monetary purchasing

power by the Government to private investors must be done overtly in DCs.

This

contrasts sharply with the LDCs, where the executive branch of government can
routinely instruct the central bank to extend loans to particular industries in
distress, giving little thought to the idea that such transfers represent
covert acts of political favoritism.

Printing money minimizes the political

costs of income transfers, because it hurts a nameless victim class that is
unaware of the cost it is bearing.
When growth is promoted through the persistent printing of purchasing
power, the transfer mechanism is dynamically complex with a delicate hidden
mechanism once described by Prof. S.C. Tsiang as the "ghostly act of silent
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stealing."

For when the printed purchasing power is granted to the private

entrepreneurs to snatch goods and services from the product market, the
repayment burden to the beneficiaries is lightened later when price inflation
occurs.

The victims (the money-users, savers, and consumers) may not even be

aware of the fact that they have been victimized by the income transfer
strategy.

(Prof. S. C. Tsiang became very unpopular in Taipei when he advised

against monetary expansion in his "ghostly" analogy.)

In LDCs money printing

is popular and the income transfer is politically expedient because, while the
beneficiaries

(i.e. those who can gain access to bank loans) are vocal in

their support, the victims are silent because they are oblivious of the
potential burden they have to bear.
Price inflation in the PRC at the present time is traceable directly to the
fact that, in the remonetized economy, the government sees the necessity that,
to promote rapid growth, it must both require and help the state enterprises in
their investment projects to make a monetary profit to show independence.

This

quasi-profit guarantee is extended to almost all the state enterprises as
employers of the workers.

The very logic of such political guarantees implies

that the artificial profit so generated must come out of the pockets of the
money using public whose resistance produces price inflation.

While the idea

is elementary, it takes a formal theory for the argument to be persuasive.
(See Section 3.)
c) The Role of Macroeconomic Theory
When monetary expansion is used as a policy instrument of aggregate demand
management for stabilization purpose in DCs, it has the theoretical backing of
a well-articulated Keynesian theory which has constituted mainstream thinking
in the postwar era.

The U.S. double-digit price inflation in the 70s

be attributed to the use (and possible misuse) of this theory in the

can only
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policy deliberations of the Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

For, with

central bank autonomy, the extent of monetary expansion is ultimately
determined by theoretical rationalization.

A prestigious macro theory can

contribute to price inflation if it sees nothing intrinsically wrong with
monetary expansion.
In the contemporary LDC, where monetary expansion is used as a policy
instrument to promote growth, one is hard put to identify an alternative
version of money theory, comparable in articulate persuasiveness with the
Keynesian theory, that is directed at the issue of price inflation in the
context of growth promotion.

In LDCs, monetary expansion and price inflation

have occurred in the postwar years in a theoretical vacuum. This is illustrated
dramatically by the inflation experience of the PRC, in which no non-Marxian
theory has yet taken firm root.

The battle against price inflation in LDCs

(including the PRC) at present is handicapped by the absence of an alternative
theory!
We will show in the next section that, in spite of its prestige, the
Keynesian theory cannot be used as a framework for the analysis of price
inflation in the PRC.

For it is a theory addressed to the special problem of

instability in the affluent DCs and is quite irrelevant to the central issue in
a growth-conscious LDC.

In fact, certain aspects of price inflation in the PRC

are traceable to the unique historical event of Chinese economic reform, and
requires special analytical treatment.
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Section 2:

The Keynesian Inflation Theory

Having analyzed the inflationary pressure generated by money printing, we
must go further and investigate the causal relation between monetary expansion
(~M) and price inflation (~p), which is the purpose of all monetary inflation
theories.

A critical examination of the Keynesian "General Theory" that has

dominated postwar macroeconomic thinking so completely is a natural point of
departure in our search for an appropriate theoretical framework for the
analysis of inflation in the PRC.

The monetary model of Keynes will be

succinctly summarized (Section 2.1) so that we can critically examine the
implied cost-push theory (Section 2.2) and the demand-pull theory (Section 2.3)
of price inflation.

The Keynesian monetary philosophy, however, cannot be a

solid foundation for a price-inflation theory for the PRC, because of its
emphasis on money as a stock of liquid assets rather than as a medium of
exchange (Section 2.4).

A genuine monetary theory of price inflation

recognizes the societal conflict of resources allocation and/or distributional
justice that lies beneath the surface of price inflation brought about by money
printing (dM/dt).

These ideas can be formulated with the aid of the "demand

for finance" concepts contained in the loanable funds theory that will be
presented in Section 2.5.
2.1)

The Keynesian Macroeconomic Theory
The academic prestige of the Keynesian theory is due not only to its

timely appearance after the Great Depression but also to the fact that it is a
well-articulated theory that ushered in an era of methodological formalism in
macroeconomics after the War.

The theory aims at the determination of a system

of related variables including real income (Y), price level (p), aggregate
demand (Y~ = pY), savings (S), investment (I), interest rate (i), money (M),
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money wage (w), real wage (wr), employment (L), and capital stock (K),
exogenously or endogenously.

The spotlight is on the pair of variables

(Y,p),

which are determined simultaneously by the interaction of aggregate demand
(A.D.) and aggregate supply (A.S.).
Aggregate Demand Function (A.D.)
Keynes postulated functions for monetary savings (S) and investment (I),
as well as their equality:
2.la)

S

S(Y8 )

b)

I

I(i)

c)

I

s

with S' > o
with I'< o

The functions for Sand I are shown in diagrams 2a and 2b, respectively,
while I= Sis represented by a 45-degree line in diagram 2c.
sloped IS curve is generated as shown in diagram 2d.

A negatively

Along this curve, for

each i the corresponding Y8 is that level of aggregate demand such that the
"gap" generated by monetary savings is exactly "plugged" by the value of
investment induced by the interest rate (i).

Keynes also postulated a money

demand function
2.2)

M = M(i, Y8 ) with 8M/8Y8 > o, 8M/8i < o

as represented by the positively sloped LM-curve in diagram 2d when a quantity
of money Mis given.

Along this curve, for each Y8 (which determines the

"transactions demand for money") the corresponding i is that level of interest
rate at which the entire money stock is demanded by the money-holding public as
traced to their preference for liquidity.

The intersection of the IS and LM

curves determines the equilibrium magnitude of aggregate demand Y~ at

E, indicated by a vertical line linking diagrams (2d) and (2f).
the product of price (p) and real income (Y) i.e.,
2. 3)

Y8 = pY

point

Since Y~ is
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an aggregate demand curve (A.D.) is represented by
d1d2d3 in diagram 2f.

rectangular hyperbola

Thus when Y8 is given a higher price level (e.g., Pl<

P2 < p3, as indicated on the horizontal axis) it corresponds to a lower level
of real output as measured on the vertical axis.

The derivation of the

aggregate demand curve is shown in diagram 2e, where equation 2.3 is
represented by radial lines for alternative values of Pi·

The values of

p ,p p are indicated on the horizontal line Y = 1, and the value for Y is
1 2 3
indicated on the vertical line Y8

Y8 .
0

The aggregate demand curve (A.D.) is

popularly described as follows:
The aggregate demand curve shows the combination of the price level and the
level of output at which the goods and assets markets are simultaneously in
equilibrium. (Dornbusch and Fischer page 353.)
Such a characterization is truly symbolic of the doctrinaire position of the
"Keynesian" school, in that the equilibrium level of real output (Y) is assumed
to depend on the extent to which money is "loved" as an asset by the populace.
Aggregate Supply Function (A.S.)
The foundation of aggregate supply is a production function from which the
total output (Y) and the marginal productivity of labor (=MPPL) can be derived
when the capital stock (K) is given:
2.4)

a) y

f(K,L)

b) y

f(K,L)

These equations are represented by the production contour map, the total output
curve, and the MPPL curve in diagrams 2g, 2h, and 2i, respectively.

Notice

that the equality of real wage with MPPL in 2.4c implies that labor is treated
as a commodity that can be hired or fired at the discretion of
maximize profit.

management to

The money wage rate, w, is the product of the real wage (wr)

and the price level (p):
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Keynes envisions a unionized labor-management relation so that the workers,
though powerless in determining the real wage (wr), can try to bargain for a
higher money wage (w).

Equation 2.5 is a rectangular hyperbola in diagram 2j

when the money wage (shown as the area of the shaded rectangle) is given.
Through the dotted rectangles linking diagrams 2f, j, i, and h, a positively
sloped aggregate supply curve (A.S.), s1, s2, s3, can be derived in diagram 2f.
Along the A.S. curve, for each Pi, the corresponding y Yi is that level of
output which management is willing to produce by hiring the appropriate amount
of labor, at the given money wage rate (w), in order to maximize profit.

Thus:

The aggregate supply curve describes the combination of outputs and price
level such that the firms are willing, given price level, to supply the
given quantity of output. (Dornbusch and Fischer, page 353.)
In comparison with the aggregate demand curve (A.D.), the aggregate supply
curve (A.S.) is not a serious doctrinaire issue that differentiates
Keynesianism from other approaches to macroeconomics.

For the A.S. curve rests

solely on the microscopic behavior foundation of individual firms that are
assumed to be profit maximizing in a competitive labor market that gives
management the freedom to increase (hire) or decrease (fire) the labor force
like a commodity.
Equilibrium
The intersection of the A.D. and A.S. curves (at s2 or d2 in diagram 2f)
determines Y and p simultaneously.

Thus we see that the Keynesian system

(i.e., Y~, Y, p, S, I, L, wr, and i) is formally determined when the triplet M,
K, and w (the money stock, capital stock, and money wage rate) are given
exogeneously.

Thus the increase of p can be wage-cost pushed (w) or

monetary-demand pulled (M) as a short-run phenomenon when K is fixed.

The fact

that the equilibrium (Y, p) is determined simultaneously, implies that in the
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Keynesian approach the theory of price inflation is meant to be complementary
to the theory of the determination of output (Y) and employment (L).

It is a

theory designed for a society that is sensitive to employment instability,
rather than one that is sensitive to the necessity of capital accumulation
traced to a shortage of output and savings capacity.

While unemployment is a

crucial policy issue in the affluent D.C., no contemporary LDC (including the
PRC) can provide a quick solution to its open and/or disguised unemployment
problems in the short-run.
Price inflation of the cost-pushed type (when the A.S. curve varies while
the A.D. curve is constant) and the demand-pulled type (when the A.D. curve
varies while the A.S. curve is fixed) will now be briefly examined.
2.2

Wage-Cost Pushed Price Inflation
When unions insist on a higher money wage, the area of the shaded rectangle

(in diagram 2.5) expands.

The upward shift of the curve representing equation

2.5 is shown in the lower deck of diagram 3a.
(See diagram 3a, upper deck.)

The A.S. curve shifts downward.

With a fixed A.D. curve, the equilibrium points

e1, e2, and e3 will change in such a way as to show that labor unions will have
to sacrifice employment (Y1 > Y2 > Y3) in order to obtain a higher real wage
r
r
r
(or MMPL, w1 < w2 < w3 <)to go along with the higher money wage (w1 < w2
< w3) that pushes the price level higher (Pl< P2 < p3).
Once price inflation has started for whatever other reasons (see section
2.3 below), the laboring class will apply political pressure to escalate the
increase in money wage to protect their real-wage income.

Money wage for the

urban labor force in the PRC has indeed been increased politically to
compensate for the increase of food costs in recent years.

However, it is

doubtful whether in the Party State of the PRC, price inflation of the
wage-cost pushed type is relevant.

For the
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cost-pushed thesis to hold, the labor market must be competitive while the
labor force must be hired and fired freely, like a commodity.

Since workers of

the state enterprises are guaranteed the job security of an "Iron Rice Bowl"
politically, and since the "profit maximizing behavior" of the state
enterprises is still an unachieved experimental objective, the PRC does not
have the microscopic behavior foundation of the aggregate supply curve at the
present time.

We may thus disregard "wage-cost pushing" as an independent and

primary cause of price inflation in the PRC where the government-societal
relation is still dominated by the government and the party.
2.3)

Demand-Pulled Price Inflation
Demand-pulled price inflation tends to occur whenever the equilibrium

magnitude of aggregate demand

(i1

the increase in aggregate demand

0

in diagram 2d) increases.

(yf < ~ < ~ i n

Associated with

diagram 3b), the A.D.

curve shifts upward, with the A.S. curve stationary, the equilibrium point ei =
(Yi, Pi) changing in such a way that the level of real output (Y1 < Y2 < Y3) as
well as the price level (p1, P2, p3), increases monotonically.
3b.)

(See diagram

The cause of the increase in y'1 may be traced to variations in the IS
0

curve or the LM curve, which represent the two types of "demand-pulled" price
inflation.
Variations of the LM curve
Keynesian theory provides the basic policy guideline that, other things
being equal, an increase in the quantity of money will lead to a downward shift
of the LM curve (e.g., from LM1 to LM2 in the upper deck of diagram 3c) and
that this, given a fixed IS curve, will raise the level of aggregate demand
(e.g., from

Yi

_-:_t...

to

rl).

Thus, an expansion of the money supply will

cure unemployment while contributing to price inflation.

However, to

characterize the Keynesian theory of price inflation as "monetary" is
misleading.
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Notice that, in a case in which the A.S. curve is vertical (as shown by the
dotted curve in the lower deck of diagram 3c), an increase in M would have no
impact on p whatsoever.

Keynes, himself, would have denied that "monetary

expansion induced price inflation" before the full employment level is reached.
Indeed, in Dornbusch and Fischer (page 353), the "Keynesian case" is popularly
described as "the case when the aggregate supply curve is vertical, indicating
that firms will supply, at the existing price level, whatever amount of goods
is demanded."

So the increase in the price level is traced strictly to the

mechanics of the law of diminishing returns to labor, which give curvature to
the MPPL and A.S. curves.
increase at all.

But this is not a monetary theory of sustained price

For there is obviously a large enough money stock (M) which

can bring about full employment at high but stable price levels!
The doctrinaire monetary position of Keynesianism implies that the causal
relationship between monetary expansion and price inflation is a very involved
and indirect one.

A larger money stock (M) must disturb the equilibrium of the

assets market first. The interest rate drops in order to induce the public to
hold the larger money stock as a liquid asset.

This will, in turn, encourage

investment, and, through the multiplier process, generate a larger aggregate
monetary demand(~) that absorbs
transaction demand.

part of the increased supply of money as

A genuine monetary theory of price inflation would have no

use for this roundabout argument.

For monetary expansion can lead directly to

price inflation only if dM/dt is viewed as an expansion of purchasing power
rather than a creation of liquid assets.

(See section 2.4 below.)

Variations of the IS Curve
When the savings function S(Y)shift upward (i.e., there is an autonomous
increase in saving) the IS

curve will move to the left.

(See diagram 3d.)

With the same L M curve, the equilibrium values of aggregate demand
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(02 < 0)
1

and the interest rate (r2 < r1) will decline.

Thus an austerity

effort is a mixed blessing since it will lead to lower real income (Y) while
achieving a lower price level (p).

This conclusion is very much at odds with

our intuition about the poor LDCs in which a national austerity effort is an
unmixed blessing, since

it can contribute to inflation control as well as to

an increase in output capacity through a more rapid pace of capital
accumulation.
The Monetary Philosophy of the General Theory

2.4)

The title of the Keynesian classic suggests that the "General Theory" is
traceable to a revolution in the philosophy of money and interest.

The policy

implication, centered in the management of aggregate demand, stresses the
feasibility of the creation and annihilation of monetary purchasing power.

The

new monetary philosophy treats Mas a store of wealth rather than a medium of
exchange, and stresses the importance of the total money stock (M) rather than
the flow of its incremental value (dM/dt).

The doctrinaire position of this

monetary philosophy is not a solid foundation on which a monetary theory of
price inflation can be erected for the LDCs.
a)

Money as a Store of Value or Medium of Exchange

Keynes inherited the Cambridge (Marshall and Hicks) tradition of overly
emphasizing money as a store of value rather than as a medium of exchange.

The

notion of a medium of exchange clearly stresses the social significance of
money, i.e. money as an instrument that facilitates exchange between two
parties much as language serves as a medium to communicate ideas.

In contrast,

the notion of a store of value stresses the personal significance of money,
much as language is a store of ideas for meditation when one is completely
alone.

The revival of the monetary culture in the PRC after 1978 suggests that
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the social (i.e., organizational) significance of Mis at least as important as
its personal (i.e., psychological) significance, because the monetary culture
really paved the way for social-organizational reform oriented toward direct
communication and interaction.
b)

(See diagram lb.)

Demand for Money as an Asset

When the asset approach is developed to its logical extreme, money becomes
one of many alternative forms of assets that enter into the psychological
utility function of a person (engaging in optimal portfolio management) who
seeks to maximize his utility.

(See introduction.)

However, the legal tender

property of money (i.e., society's consent to the compulsory power of money to
cancel debt) implies that the lion's share of the money held by individuals
really came into their possession involuntarily, since one has no choice but to
accept his monthly pay check.1

Professor Hicks, who initiated the assets

approach in 1935 (see Hicks, 1935), deplored the over- voluntarization of the
demand for money in the utility maximization approach when he declared in 1967
that the Cambridge School, from Marshall down to Keynes, has
tried to match the whole stock requirement for money in voluntary terms.
This, I now feel, was confusing; it had sent many of us (myself included)
chasing what I now feel to be "will-of' -wisps." (Hicks 1967, p 16.)
If it is questionable to "match the whole stock requirement for money in
voluntary terms" in an industrially advanced country, it is certainly more so
for the socialist PRC.

For in the capitalistic DCs, there at least exists a

whole range of different types of monetized assets available for portfolio
choice.

In contrast, in the PRC portfolio management is trivial because money

is the only major type of monetized asset available to the money-using public.
Hicks believed that the lion's share of money:
is the money that is needed to circulate a certain volume of goods, at a
particular level of price. The old Fisher equation MV = pY gives a better
picture of it than the over voluntarized 'Cambridge equation', M = k pY'. In
relation to this part of money stock, 'velocity of circulation' is perfectly
appropriate. (Hicks 1967 pp. 15-16, underlined Cambridge equation supplied.)
I

See Tsiang (1982) for ideas covered in this subsection.
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Hicks took the trouble to remind us that money as a medium of exchange
(i.e., to circulate a certain volume of goods at a certain velocity V) is far
more important than money as a store of value (i.e., to be demanded at a
certain k).

Furthermore, Vis not just the inverse of k; it is superior to kl

Instead of "demand for money", the LM curve should be interpreted as the "old
Fisher equation" in which the velocity (V) is interest elastic.2

This switch,

from a monetary philosophy which regards money as a desirable property to be
held, to one that regards Mas

purchasing power to be spent is an essential

first step in moving toward a monetary theory of price inflation.
c)

The Total Money Stock (M) and Money Printing dM/dt

When Mis interpreted as a medium of exchange to accommodate trade (rather
than as a stock of wealth to bring personal satisfaction), the increment of
money through time dM/dt (i.e., money printing as it will be referred to from
now on) becomes logically and consistently an artificial creation of unearned
monetary purchasing power to command goods and services in the market in
competition with the circulation of the existing money stock (M) representing
attempts to buy goods and services by the purchasing power that the income
recipients honestly earn.

Instead of the round-about way of the Keynesian

approach (as we have described above in diagram 3c), the printing of purchasing
power, dM/dt, can bring about price inflation quite directly.
In a monetary theory of price inflation, the causal relationship between
dM/dt and dp/dt is not brought about mechanically (e.g., by the curvature of
the MPPL curve in diagram 3c).

A genuine monetary theory tries to probe

beneath the surface of the correlation between dM/dt and dp/dt to uncover the
social conflicts inherent in the money-printing process.

The purchasing power

2 For example, in the upper deck of diagram 3c, with a drop of the interest
rate from A to B, the value of V decreases because a larger M2 is needed to
circulate the same volume of Y~ = pY.

'
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competition becomes an allocational conflict if the printed money dM/dt aims at
a type of product (e.g., military goods during a war) different from that
traced to the circulation of M (e.g., civilian goods needed by the money-using
public).

Money printing can also be a source of conflict of distributional

justice, as the purchasing power competition is between those who earn their
income (in the case of the circulating M) and those who can gain access to the
printed money (i.e., dM/dt) through political favoritism.

When the power to

print money is monopolized by the government of a sovereign state to promote
growth, as in the LDCs (see section one), the competition of purchasing power
becomes much more severe, escalating into a full-scale government-societal
conflict accompanied by rampaging price inflation.

Without a vision of

distributional and allocational conflict, a monetary theory of price inflation
degenerates into a superficial mechanical exercise.

When the entire money

stock is treated as an asset, the Keynesian inflation theory reviewed above
represents such a case of degeneration.
2.5)

Loanable Funds Theory
A rigorous formulation of the idea of the competition of purchasing power

goes to the heart of the prewar loanable funds theory that recognized the
inequality of savings and investment rather than their definitional equality in
the Keynesian approach.

(See Harris 1947, page 33.)

2.6a)

I(i)

S(Y~) (Keynesian)

b)

I(i)

S(Y~) + dM/dt (Loanable Funds)

The Keynesian IS curve (2.6a) of diagram 2d is the solid curve reproduced
in diagram 4d.

For a typical monetary income level Y~, the corresponding

interest rate rn is now interpreted as the natural rate.

When a positive value

of money printing (dM/dt) is given, I is greater than S.

The solid curve

shifts downward to a position shown by the dotted curve representing equation
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2.6b.

For each Y~, the corresponding interest rater (that is lower than the

natural rate ~M) is the market rate of interest.

Thus for given S(Y~) and

I(i), the interest rate is lowered (r < rn) while the level of investment is
raised

(Ir> IM) by money printing for every level of monetary Y~.

Equation 2.6b states that voluntary savings S(Y~) and money printing dM/dt
are two alternative sources of supply of monetary purchasing power to meet
entrepreneurial demand for money for investment finance.

This notion of

demand for money for investment finance emerged as a result of an important
debate between Keynes and Ohlin, after the publication of the General Theory in
which Keynes was quite apologetic when he stated:
He has compelled me to attend to an important link in the causation chain
which I had previously overlooked ........ the additional factor previously
overlooked, to which Professor Ohlin's emphasis on the~ ante character
of investment decision has directed to is the following. During the
interregime - and during that period only - between the date when the
entrepreneur arranges his finance and the date when he actually makes his
investment, there is an additional demand for liquidity ........ This factor
should certainly be included in the list of motives (transaction,
precautionary and speculative) affecting the state of liquidity
preference ........ I should not have previously overlooked this point since
it is the copying stone of the liquidity theory of the rate of interest.
(Keynes, EJ No. 32, 1937, underlining supplied.)
Planned investment, i.e. investment ex ante may have to secure its
"financial provision" before the investment takes place ........ I should (I
now think) have done well to have emphasized it when I analyzed the
various sources of the demand for money in the General Theory. (Keynes,
EJ, No. 37, 1937 underlining supplied.)
These apologetic remarks of Keynes obviously made no impression on his
modern followers who regard Mas an asset.

Keynes has made it perfectly clear

that the demand for money for "finance" is something quite different from the
"transactions demand."

While the transactions "demand" for money to pay wage

bills or grocery bills is instinctive or involuntary (see section 2.4b above),
the demand for finance is a voluntary calculated decision to acquire monetary
purchasing power in the financial market with the full intention to command
goods and services in the product market leading to capital accumulation.

In a
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stagnant economy with zero investment, the "transactionsdemand" is positive and
the "demand for finance" is zero.

In a growing economy of the real world, the

"transactions demand" misses the vital part of the demand for money for finance
associated with positive investment and capital accumulation.

It is the

"demand for finance" that will have to be stressed in formulating a theory of
price inflation for growth sensitive LDCs.

We will attempt to formulate a

loanable funds theory that was not formulated rigorously before the War3 and
probably would not have survived against the Keynesian tide after the War.
The construction of a loanable funds theory, even a crude version, is an
essential first step in a counter-Keynesian revolution aiming at an inflation
theory appropriate for an economy (e.g., an LDC) sensitive to the shortage of
resources.

3 In the Quarterly Journal of Economics (November 1936), the verdict on the
General Theory by Robertson reads "ultimately, therefore, it is not as a
refutation of a common-sense account of events in terms of supply and demand
for loanable funds, but as an alternative version to it." To this, Keynes
complained of the lack of a formal loanable fund theory by remarking that "Mr.
Robertson gives no reference to where the 'common sense account of events in
terms of the supply and demand for loanable funds' is to be found ..... "
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Section 3:

Money Expansion and the Loanable Funds Theory

Having critically examined the Keynesian theory in the last section, our
present goal is to propose that the appropriate theoretical framework for the
analysis of price inflation in LDCs is provided by the prewar Loanable Funds
Theory.

The Loanable Funds Theory will be examined in terms of its relation to

growth performance (3.1) and the dynamic of finance (3.2).

While price

inflation has a nominal monetary cause (3.3), what lies beneath are social
conflicts that are inevitable when money printing is politicized for the
purpose of growth promotion (3.4).
3.1) Politicized Loanable Funds Theory for Growth Promotion in LDCs
The prewar Loanable Funds Theory was developed for the industrially
advanced countries at a time when growth and development had not yet become
distinct economic discipline.

Indeed, the distinction between DCs and LDCs in

economics was a postwar phenomenon associated with the revival of theoretical
interest in economic development.

The Loanable Funds Theory is suitable as a

framework for inflation analysis in the LDCs because its core argument aptly
depicts the growth-promotional role of the government via money printing and
the inevitability of price inflation when such a policy is persistently
pursued.
In the developmental process of the LDCs, shortages of saving and
entrepreneurship are the two major bottlenecks for capital accumulation.
Diagram (4), presented earlier, shows that money printing can provide an
improvised solution to both problems. First of all, the interest cost is
lowered artificially for infant entrepreneurs.

Thus, the printing of

purchasing power leads directly to the manufacture of windfall profits that
encourage private investment.

a

By the same magic stroke of money printing,
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resources can be made available to investors at levels that exceed the
voluntary saving capacity.

Before the War, the natural flow of resources could

be distorted by the elastic supply of money generated by the private banks, and
this could lead to economic instability due to "monetary overinvestment." (See
"Monetary Over-Investment Theories" in Haberler 1946.)

When money printing was

politicized after the War for growth promotion, reasons monetary over
investment became more severe on account of its persistence and directional
non-neutrality.

(See l.3ab in section 1.)

Money printing became politically

popular because windfall profits appeal to vested interests while
"over-investment" appeals to vested ideas (i.e., growth promotion).
The gap between saving and investment (i.e. dM/dt=ab) in diagram 4 is
referred to as forced saving in the Loanable Funds literature because the
saver's sovereignty is violated.

In the case of the PRC, people were never

granted the right to make saving decisions and were always "forced to save" in
the party state before 1978.

When viewed in the light of this historical

background, money printing and forced saving are quite natural at the present
time, because what has been covertly subverted (i.e., the saver's sovereignty)
was never respected as a tradition in the first place.

Price inflation has

occurred now because, with monetization, the money using public can effectively
challenge the austerity decisions of the government.
3.2)

The Dynamics of Finance
All inflation theories are dynamic because their aim is to explain price

changes over time.

The demand for money for finance is a dynamic concept in

the Loanable Funds Theory that recognizes a time lag between money printing and
money injection that take place in the finance and product markets,
respectively and separately.

The injection of money will lead to an increase

of the total money stock in the circulation stream and this is conducive to
price inflation
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according to the time-honored equation of exchange.
a)

The Creation and Injection of Purchasing Power for Planned Investment

In the dynamic macroeconomic framework shown for two consecutive periods in
diagram 5, the product market and the loanable funds market are marked off
separately.

In the financial market, saving (St) and money printing (dM/dt) in

this period

will be used to finance planned (or ex ante) investment (It+l) in

this period in preparation for the actual spending of It+l to buy capital goods
in the next period.

Denoting real saving (investment) by St(It), we have

PtSt + ~ = PtI*+l

3.1)

There is a time lag between the creation of purchasing power(~) (in the
finance market) and the actual spending of the same for investment in the
product market.

Through the spending of newly printed purchasing power, more

money is injected into the circulation stream to augment the total money stock
held by the money-using public.

While the creation of purchasing power is a

"conspiracy" between the government and a minority of borrowers (those favored
by the authorities), that conspiracy will affect everyone and meet the
resistance of the vast majority of the money-using public when the new money is
injected.

When the demand for finance is satisfied by the printing of money

rather than by voluntary saving from earned income, the injection of

new money

always runs into "purchasing power competition" in the product market.
b)

The Equation of Exchange and Inflation

The equation of exchange explains why and how much price inflation will
occur when the total money stock is increased.
3.2a)

pY=MV implying,

b)

'7p=E + '7V

where

c)

E = '7 M - '7y

The inflation rate (77P) is determined by of E, the excess of '7M over
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the real GNP growth rate ~Y' and ~v' the growth of velocity.

(See 3.2b.)

The

equation of exchange can be written in equivalent forms involving the
Marshallian k (=1/V):
3.3a)

Mt.

kY

b)

Mt.

M/P,

c)

~v

-~k > 0

where
k=l/V

Equation 3.3a can be interpreted as a behavioral equation of the demand for
real money (Mt.= M/p), with a coefficient k per unit of real income flow (Y).
However, for inflation analysis, it is far more convenient to interpret ~V > o
(or ~k < o) as a quickening of the pace of spending by the money-using public
in its protest against the encroachment on the saver's sovereignty by the
political authority.
3.3)

(See 2.4b in last section.)

Causation of Price Inflation
Price inflation is always attributable to conflicts or the lack of societal

consensus in regard to the output composition of production (or what should be
produced) and/or income distribution equity (or how to share economic benefits
fairly).

In the growth sensitive LDCs, the production contradiction is a

government-societal conflict in respect to the division of output for
consumption or accumulation;

the distributional conflict is between the

favored entrepreneurial class and the money-using public that is exploited by
the money-printing government.

A sense of these conflicts is conveyed by the

notion of forced saving in the Loanable Funds theory.
a)

Savings and the Forced Savings Rate

When equation 3.1 is divided by the price level (p), we have approximately
(when the interval of planning for ex ante investment is short)
3.4a)
b)

(dM/dt)/p = I-S

implying

J = (dM/dt)/pY = I/Y - S/Y

The term (dM/dt)/p in equation 3.4a will be referred to as forced saving.
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since it is the additional amount of real goods and services that can be
snatched away from the market for investment beyond the quantity sanctioned by
voluntary saving (S).

In equation 3.4b, J is the forced saving rate, as it is

the amount of forced saving expressed as a fraction of real GNP.

These

concepts follow logically from the notion of demand for money for finance in
the loanable funds approach.
b)

Growth Promotion with Forced Saving

When money printing is politicized in a growth-sensitive LDC (see Section
I, 1.2b) to achieve a high forced saving rate, (J) becomes a primary policy
objective of growth promotion to expand the output capacity (dY/dt) over time.
Let us denote the (average) voluntary propensity to accumulate (s) and the
marginal productivity of investment (0) as4
3.Sa)
b)

dY/dt = OI

(or ~y = OI/Y)

s=S/Y

In 3.Sa, 0 is the incremental output capacity per unit of real investment (I)
(its inverse (1/0) is the marginal capital-output ratio).

In 3.Sb, the

voluntary average propensity to accumulate (s) is saving (S) expressed as a
percentage of capacity output (Y).

The resemblance of s to the Keynesian

average propensity to save is only superficial, because Y is the capacity
output the expansion of which is directly traceable to investment.

When

equation 3.4b is substituted into 3.Sa we have
3.6)

Os+ OJ

Notice that sO = s/(1/0) is a saving-pushed growth rate of capital of the
Harrod-Domar variety, as it is the ratio of s to the marginal capital-output
ratio (1/0).

A similar interpretation can be given to OJ.

Thus the rate of

4 From the production function Y = f(K, L), we have 8Y/8t = fKdK/dt when Lis
fixed. Thus O in 3.Sa is the marginal productivity of capital. In LDCs,
characterized by the shortage of capital and the redundancy of the labor force,
it is reasonable to assume dY/dt = fKI.
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expansion of GNP is related to the "pushing" force of voluntary saving Os and
the politicized forced saving via money printing (OJ).

A high forced saving

rate is politically irresistible because it appears to be a costless and
convenient way to promote growth.
c)

Forced-Saving Rates and the Severity of Price Inflation

Since the forced-saving rate (J) (in equation 3.4b) is a result of money
printing, its potency to give that extra push to the expansion of output
capacity (OJ in eq. 3.6) is realizeable only at the social cost of price
inflation.

For, with the aid of the equation of exchange (eq. 3.2a), the

forced saving rate can be written as:
3.7)

J=r, M/V

(Proof:

J=(dM/dt)/PY=((dM/dt/M).(M/PY) = r,M/V

which is the ratio of the money growth rate r,M to V.

Thus a high value of J is

realizeable by a higher money printing rate (r,M) by the government and a slower
pace of money spending by the money-using public (V).

The two causes of price

inflation (E and "v in eq. 3.2b) can be written as follows:
3.8a)

r,p=E+r,v where

b)

E=ur,M-Os

c)

u=l-0/V= (v-0)/V

Proof: E

r,M-r,Y=r,M-(Os+OJ) by 3.6)
r,M(l-0/V) by 3.7 QED.

Thus the severity of price inflation can be decomposed into the effect of E
when Vis constant, and an "v effect.

The two sub-cases can be analyzed

separately.
Constant V Case
When Vis constant, equation 3.8b becomes r,

p

= E.

A high voluntary

propensity to accumulate (s) always contributes not only to an increase in
output but also to a lessening of the pressure for price inflation, especially
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when O is high (i.e. when output capacity expands rapidly with investment).
The linkage of s with price inflation in this way has always been recognized by
the followers of Keynes in the early postwar years. Thus Alvin Hansen made the
following observation regarding the U.S. economy in 1957:
Our economy is equipped with three powerful safeguards against peacetime
inflation: (1) our prodigious capacity to increase production under
pressure (i.e. a high 0), (2) our capacity, both corporate and individuals,
to save at high income levels (i.e. a highs); and (3) our demonstrated
capacity at responsible fiscal and monetary management (i.e. central bank
autonomy). (Hansen 1957 page 42, underlining supplied).
Hansen would certainly have agreed that, when an economy is deprived of
such safeguards (e.g. in the LDCs or the U.S. after 1973), the pertinent theory
of price inflation is the Loanable Funds Theory.
The term u=l-0/V in 3.8c is an "inflation multiplier" which magnifies the
impact of the money growth rate on the inflation rate.

It is reasonable to

assume that the multiplier is positive.
3.9a)
b)

u > 0 implied by
V

> 0

Equation 3.9b shows that V and O really have the same dimension of being a
flow-stock ratio.

When O is fixed, the multiplier U takes on a higher value

when Vis larger or, in other words, when the money-using public spends their
money at a faster pace.

When Vis fixed, it takes on a higher value when O is

small, or when investment financed by money printing has limited output-raising
effects.

In the prewar literature a small O is traceable to a long gestation

period for investment, while, more recently, it has been amenable to a
supply-side interpretation . .2./
lag O must obviously be

The money-spending habit (V) and the gestation

part of the theory of price inflation when its root

cause is traceable to economic scarcity .

.2./ For the notion of the "gestation" (or "construction") period in prewar
business cycle literature, see Haberler, page 136.
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Variable V Case
When evaluating equation 3.8a, we see that an increasing pace of spending,
proxied by a positive ~V > 0, really applies additional pressure for price
inflation.

Equation 3.7 implies:

3.10)
Hence the forced-saving rate is increased by money acceleration ~~M' while
decreased by

~v·

Thus ~J can be interpreted as the result of a tug of war in

purchasing-power competition between the money-printing government(~~) and
M

the money-using public, with the latter protesting against the money-printing
policy that encroaches on their saver sovereignty.

They can protest

effectively by spending their money faster (~V).
In the party-controlled PRC, a faster pace of spending by the money-using
public reduces the value of J and is an effective way to frustrate the
government's growth-promotion effort.

In the absence of a meaningful

goverment-societal dialogue, inflation can occur if an ambitious investment
program, dictated by the government with a view to future growth, is not
sanctioned by high voluntary saving on the part of a society that, having lost
faith in the future, is preoccupied primarily with the present.
It is well known that, when society is infected with an inflation
psychology, the public will insist on a high value of ~V > 0, (Cagan 1956). In
this situation (i.e., when ~V > 0), the government will have to give up its
practice of promoting growth through

money printing.

Otherwise, money

printing would have to accelerate (~~M > 0) to maintain a constant forced
saving rate (~J=O).

Equation 3.8a implies that in th latter case, price

inflation will get out of control because both ~Mand u will increase through
time.

While it is convenient and easy for a government to initiate a

forced-saving policy to promote growth via money-printing, it is very difficult
to sustain it when citizens with inflation expectations have the freedom to

iI.
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spend money to protect themselves. For these reasons, an economy's reliance on
forced saving to promote growth is intrinsically unstable.

For the PRC, now a

monetized LDC economy, the best cure for price inflation in the long run is to
stop it in its tracks before it gathers momentum.

The Chinese people do have

the power to defeat any forced-saving policy by stepping up the pace of their
spending.
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Section 4:

Modeling of Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Inflation Analysis

One major institutional difference between the socialist PRC and a
capitalist DC or LDC is in respect to their

fiscal systems.

The socialist

government receives the lion's share of its revenue as taxes and "profit" in
its capacity as "owners" of state enterprises, and allocates the lion's share
of its expenditures for investment in them.

In contrast, government

expenditures allocated for investment in public enterprises in capitalist
countries are relatively small or even insignificant.

Thus for inflation

analysis in the PRC, the Loanable Funds model outlined in the last section must
be expanded to include fiscal policies (4.1). Following that, we can then
investigate the time-honored topic of the impact of government budget deficits
on price inflation (4.2).

When this model is applied to the socialist PRC, the

root cause of inflation is shown to arise from monetary policies directed
toward promoting growth and enhancing political stability.
4.1)

Monetary and Fiscal Policies
Seen in a historical perspective, public finance was not a part of

macroeconomics in the inter-war period.
and

The integration of monetary policies

fiscal policies in the same theoretical framework of reasoning,

directed at the issue of economic instability, was a notable contribution of
Keynes.

Since a contemporary LDC is concerned primarily with growth, monetary

and fiscal policies should be integrated in the loanable funds framework to
illuminate the growth-promotional role of the government.

Monetary policy

becomes a growth- promotion instrument because it can bolster profits and
command resources for investment finance through forced saving.
Section 3.)

(See 3.1 in

Fiscal policies via deficit finance can also become a

growth-promotional instrument for the same reason.
inflationary impact of fiscal

However, to examine the
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policies, we must decompose government expenditures into components that may or
may not be directly relevant to growth.
a)

The Public and Private Demand for Finance

Equation 3.1 can be modified by adding a term (B), which corresponds to the
government budget deficit (i.e., the gap between expenditure G and revenue T):
dM/dt = B + pI -pS

4.1)

where B = G - T

Money printing (dM/dt) now serves to plug both the I-S gap and the budget
deficit gap (B).

The printing of monetary purchasing power allows the

beneficiaries (i.e., the government itself and the private money borrowers) to
command resources in the product market.

The two-gap approach indicates that

the plugging of two types of "demand in finance" by means of artificially
printed purchasing power is the root cause of price inflation.
As the two borrowing parties compete for the demand of loanable funds,
money printing can prevent private borrowers (I) from getting squeezed out of
the finance market by Bas the market rate of interest is lowered.

Thus, by

money printing, the profit for investors is raised while the interest burden of
the government is lowered.

The political pressure for money printing is

irresistible both because private entrepreneurs and the finance minister
welcome it and because society can be persuaded to accept this convenient and
"costless" method of growth promotion.
b)

The Growth Promotion Role of Public Expenditures (G)

The issue of whether or not government expenditures (G) can contribute to
an increase in the supply of real output (dY/dt) is obviously a matter of
crucial importance.

Certain government expenditures for public consumption

(e.g., investment in human capital or social infrastructure such as
health, roads) do serve a constructive growth-promoting purpose.
these growth-promotional expenditures are usually viewed as

education,

However,
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public consumption because of the long gestation lag involved.

The prewar

monetary over-investment theory made it abundantly clear that the financing of
investment projects with long gestation periods through monetary expansion
invites concurrent inflation, in spite of its long-run contribution to
productivity expansion.
Expenditures on national defense and law enforcement serve no
growth-promotion purposes for the same reason, i.e. they do not contribute to a
concurrent expansion of output.

Indeed, there are government expenditures

(e.g. on welfare) that are counter-productive to growth promotion when
considered from the "supply side."

For the analysis of price inflation, one

has to assess the timing of output response associated with different types of
government expenditures.

For simplicity we shall assume that the term Bin 4.1

will not contribute to any expansion of output.
4.2)

Taxation Without Consent and the Inflation Tax
It is well known that money printing that allows the government to acquire

the real resources needed to fight a long war is comparable to taxation without
consent.

Similarly, in a peacetime economy, forced saving is comparable to an

inflation tax.

In the two-gap approach, voluntary and forced saving

accommodate the two types of demand for finance (I and B) jointly.
a)

Taxation Without Consent
Let us assume that all government expenditures (G) are of the public

consumption or non-productive variety; then investment (I) is the only
expenditure that contributes to output expansion dY/dt. Equations (4.1) and
(3.5) imply:
4.2a)

(dM)/p = B/p + I -

at

s

b)

J = (dM)/pY = Bl!. + (dY)/0 - s where

c)

Bl!.

d)

'7y + OB.6 = OJ + sO

at

B/pY

at
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All the equations in the monetary model described in the last section are
generalized with the addition of one term related to the budget deficit. Thus
forced saving (dM/dt)/p is used to finance the I-S gap and the real budget gap
(B/p) (eq. 4.2a).

In 4.2b the forced-saving rate (J) includes a new term (B~)

representing the deficit-income ratio (i.e., the real government budget deficit
as a fraction of GNP) (eq 4.2c).

The forced-saving term (OJ) supplements

voluntary saving (sO) to solve a new type of problem beyond growth promotion
(~y), namely to provide resources for public consumption unsupported by tax

payments.

Equation 4.2b shows that the impounding of resources by money

printing (OJ) supplements voluntary savings (sO) for the promotion of growth
(~y) and/or political stability (OB~).

b)

(See below.)

Causation of Price Inflation

When equation 4.2 is substituted into 3.2b we have:
4.3)

~p = ~M(l-0/V) + OB~ - s0 + ~V

As compared with equation (3.8), we see that the only difference is the
addition of a new term, OB~.

Notice that the budget deficit contributes to a

higher inflation rate when it accounts for a higher percentage of GNP--as we
would expect.

Since a larger public deficit amounts to a diversion of

resources from growth-promotion to consumption, it will lead to heavier
price-inflation pressure when the marginal productivity of investment (0) is
high.
4.3)

Growth with Political Stability
While monetary expansion is used in DCs for stabilization and in LDCs for

growth-promotion purposes, it is used in the PRC at present to promote
political stability as well.

The cure for price inflation must therefore also

be centered on a political solution.
a) Promotion of Growth and Political Stability
Since the founding of the socialist state 40 years ago, the politically
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sensitive urban class in the PRC has gradually become accustomed to and taken
for granted government guarantees -- not only of a package of welfare benefits
such as education, health and social insurance, but also of basic needs such as
food, clothing and shelter.

Those who are younger than 40 know only a way of

life that relies on the patronage of the political power for the provision of
the basic needs of daily existence, and the guarantee of such basic needs by
the State has become a minimum condition for political stability.
At present, much of the government deficit in the PRC (represented by the
term OB~ in eq 4.3) consists of transfer payments to finance the basic needs of
the urban population.

When the government precluded the bankruptcy of state

enterprises by monetary subsidies, it essentially guaranteed the basic needs of
the workers in these factories.

(The proposed bankruptcy laws explicitly

confirm these guarantees in case a state enterprise declares bankruptcy in
court.)

State subsidization of state trading to make up the difference between

the high procurement prices of agricultural goods (paid to the farmers) and the
low retail prices in the urban centers also guarantees the basic needs of the
urban population.

Seen in historical perspective, the foundation of political

stability has shifted from austerity discipline through ideological
indoctrination before 1978 to a political guarantee system (OB~) after 1978 via
the granting of monetary purchasing power in a monetized society.
The terms on the left-hand side of equation 4.2d succinctly summarize the
political-economic causation of price inflation in the PRC.

The political

guarantee (OB~) and the ambitious growth promotion goal by money printing
(i.e., ~Y' aimed at

the quadrupling of GNP by the year 2000) must be regarded

as the primary causes.

Inflation will be unavoidable when these pressures

overwhelm the growth rate sanctioned by voluntary savings (sO) and forced
savings (OJ), as depicted in equation 4.2d -- and the public responds by
spending money at an increasingly faster rate.
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b)

The Cure for Price Inflation
To maintain growth with political stability. monetary expansion in the PRC

will be unavoidable.

Thus to control price inflation, it is essential to

increase the voluntary saving capacity (Os).

For this purpose, the populace

must have a clear vision of the benefits that voluntary saving can bring to
them.

The experience of Taiwan has shown that the voluntary saving capacity

can be quite high when individual Chinese are allowed the freedom of
accumulating a variety of financial assets (stocks, bonds, and deposits in the
formal financial markets) -- i.e., the freedom to earn property income
(interest and profits) as good "capitalists" who have an insatiable drive for
accumulation.
In the PRC at present, families cannot purchase stocks and bonds because
the proprietorship of the state enterprises is yet to be privatized.

As long

as the Party insists on the thought of "Marxism and Maoism" they have a strong
precautionary motive not to be labeled

"capitalists" in the first place.

Under these conditions, families can satisfy their drive for accumulation only
by acquiring bank deposits (M), furniture, or TVs.

Thus, in the short run, a

high propensity to save can be sustained only by a high-interest policy that
induces the populace to hold cash (M).

However, a sustained high rate of

voluntary saving accompanied by the growth of a money stock (M) that circulates
slowly is almost an impossibility, according to the monetarists (Friedman 1956,
1970).

In the long run a high average propensity to save can be sustained only

when families are given more freedom to become "capitalists" -- i.e., to become
part owners of the state enterprises or, more promisingly, the exclusive owners
of private enterprises.

Ultimately, inflation control is a

political-ideological issue in the PRC.
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